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ALTERNATIVES TO CALIFORNIA’S SB 27:
INCENTIVIZING THE RELEASE OF TAX
RETURNS WITHOUT RESTRICTING BALLOT
ACCESS
Matthew Tang*
Donald Trump is the first President since 1977, and the first majorparty nominee since 1980, to refuse to release any of his federal income
tax returns. This break in tradition has led lawmakers in at least twentyfive states to propose legislation requiring presidential candidates to
disclose their tax returns in order to appear on state ballots. California
is one of those states. On July 30, 2017, California Governor Gavin
Newsom signed SB 27 into law, effectively barring presidential
candidates who have not made available for public inspection the last
five years of their income tax returns from appearing on the state’s
primary ballots. However, on October 2, 2019, a federal district court
issued a preliminary injunction against SB 27 on the theory that it
violated the Presidential Qualifications Clause as well as the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. And on November 21, 2019, the California
Supreme Court struck down SB 27 for violating article II of the
California Constitution. This Note proposes two alternative approaches
to incentivizing the release of tax returns that avoid the California and
Federal Constitutional challenges faced by SB 27. The first involves
fining or otherwise penalizing presidential candidates who fail to release
their tax returns without denying them ballot access. The second involves
taking note of a candidate’s failure to release his or her tax returns either
on the ballots themselves or on the informational material that typically
accompanies them.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S.E., Electrical
Engineering, Princeton University, June 2009. Many thanks to Professor Justin Levitt, whose
advice and feedback have been invaluable to the writing of this Note, and to the members of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, whose diligent work has made publication of this Note possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“If I decide to run for office, I’ll produce my tax returns,
absolutely.”1 Six years after making this initial commitment—three
after assuming office—President Trump has yet to produce a single
page of the promised documents.2 It seems that a forty-year tradition
of Presidents releasing their tax returns has come to an end.3
Perhaps in response to President Trump’s refusal to release his
tax returns, California recently enacted Senate Bill 27 (SB 27)
requiring that presidential candidates make available for public
inspection the last five years of their income tax returns in order to
appear on the state’s primary ballots.4 California is not alone. In at
least twenty-five states, lawmakers have introduced bills requiring
presidential candidates to make similar disclosures.5 By mandating a
practice that was once voluntary, these bills codify a custom that has
long served the twin goals of voter education and candidate
accountability.6
Proponents of the bills argue that a candidate’s tax returns afford
voters invaluable insight into a candidate’s values in ways that
campaign ads and ballot biographies cannot.7 The business dealings
1. Ireland AM, Colette Fitzpatrick Meets Donald Trump!, YOUTUBE (May 20, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg-5KEt1Abg.
2. Katie Rogers, Trump on Releasing His Tax Returns: From ‘Absolutely’ to ‘Political
Prosecution’, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/us/politics/trumptaxes.html (updated Sept. 27, 2020).
3. See Joseph J. Thorndike, Tax History: From Nixon to Trump: A Short History of Voluntary
Tax Disclosure, TAX NOTES (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayfederal/return-preparation/tax-history-nixon-trump-short-history-voluntary-taxdisclosure/2019/02/11/29409.
4. S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“Notwithstanding any other law, the Secretary
of State shall not print the name of a candidate for President of the United States on a primary
election ballot, unless the candidate, at least 98 days before the presidential primary election, files
with the Secretary of State copies of every income tax return the candidate filed with the Internal
Revenue Service in the five most recent taxable years . . . . Within five days of receipt of the
candidate’s tax returns, the Secretary of State shall make redacted versions of the tax returns
available to the public on the Secretary of State’s internet website.”).
5. Alexi McCammond, The Big Picture: The State Efforts to Keep Trump Off the 2020 Ballot,
AXIOS (June 24, 2018), https://www.axios.com/states-tax-return-laws-presidential-2020-trump88e84cce-7214-409d-b4c7-a24aad919bdb.html/.
6. See S.B. 27 (“The information in tax returns . . . helps voters to make a more informed
decision. . . . The people of California can better estimate the risks of any given Presidential
candidate engaging in corruption or the appearance of corruption if they have access to candidates’
tax returns.”).
7. See id. (“[I]ncome tax returns provide voters with essential information regarding the
candidate’s potential conflicts of interest, business dealings, financial status, and charitable
donations.”).
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and charitable donations revealed by a candidate’s tax returns, for
example, give voters a raw glimpse into a candidate’s activities
separate from the carefully curated image he or she might present on
the campaign trail. Moreover, tax returns provide states with an
invaluable tool to ferret out conflicts of interest, corruption, or
violations of law.8 States have an indisputable interest in exposing the
unscrupulous—and perhaps criminal—activity of anyone who might
appear on their ballots, and that interest reaches its apex when the
ballots list candidates for the highest office in the land.9
On the other hand, the principles undergirding laws like SB 27
can in theory support less palatable disclosure requirements. When
vetoing a similar bill two years ago,10 then California Governor Jerry
Brown wrote: “Today we require tax returns, but what would be next?
Five years of health records? A certified birth certificate? High school
report cards? And will these requirements vary depending on which
political party is in power?”11 But more importantly, laws that make
ballot access contingent on the production of tax returns may not pass
constitutional muster. A mere four months after California Governor
Gavin Newsom signed SB 27 into law, the California Supreme Court
struck it down for violating the California Constitution.12 Although
similar statutes in other states are not subject to the California
8. See id.
9. Even if a presidential candidate is not a citizen of a state requiring the production of his or
her tax returns, such a state nevertheless maintains an interest in ensuring compliance with federal
law on behalf of its citizens. For example, SB 27 cites California’s interest in making sure that
“statutory prohibitions on behavior such as insider trading are detected and punished.” Id. Insider
trading affects shareholders not just in California, but in all fifty states. Moreover, states may have
an interest in exposing violations of the Emoluments Clauses of the United States Constitution. See
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 138–39, 142 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding
that owners of hotels, restaurants, and event spaces had standing to sue President Trump for
accepting government patronage of Trump properties because such patronage diverted business
away from their establishments). But see Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(finding that Congress’s “loss of political power” related to President Trump’s alleged violations
of the Emoluments Clauses was insufficient to support standing); In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 379
(4th Cir. 2019) (finding that Maryland and the District of Columbia’s interest in enforcing the
Emoluments Clauses was too “attenuated and abstract” to support standing), reh’g en banc granted,
780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir. 2019).
10. See S.B. 149, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
11. SB 149 Veto Message from Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (Oct. 15, 2017),
https://web.archive.org/web/20171219002118/https:/www.gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_149_Veto_Messa
ge_2017.pdf.
12. See Patterson v. Padilla, 451 P.3d 1171, 1191 (Cal. 2019) (finding on Nov. 21, 2019 that
SB 27 violated article II, section 5(c) of the California Constitution). SB 27 was signed into law on
July 30, 2019. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6883 (Deering 2020), invalidated by Patterson v. Padilla,
451 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2019).
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Constitution, opponents of SB 27 have additionally argued that the
law, and presumably others like it, run afoul of the Federal
Constitution.13 In particular, they assert that because Article II of the
Federal Constitution establishes the substantive qualifications for the
presidency,14 requiring the production of tax returns constitutes an
impermissible addition to these qualifications.15 They further contend
that such a requirement infringes upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of candidates and voters.16
Part II of this Note briefly surveys the constitutional challenges
brought against SB 27, one of which has already proven fatal to the
law.17 The remainder of the Note explores two potential alternatives
to SB 27 that accomplish substantially the same goals while
sidestepping many of the constitutional issues that plagued it. In
particular, Part III examines the potential for California and other
states to fine or otherwise penalize presidential candidates who fail to
release their tax returns without denying them ballot access. And Part
IV examines the viability of laws that do not require candidates to
produce their tax returns, but instead allow ballots or informational
material accompanying them to take note of a candidate’s failure to do
so.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SB 27
The following contains a brief overview of the three main
constitutional challenges to SB 27—the first, based on the California
Constitution, applies only to California laws, but the latter two apply
with equal force to similar regulations in other states. This is helpful
both to understand the weight of the arguments against SB 27 and its
peers and to appreciate the hurdles that this Note’s two proposed
alternatives seek to overcome.

13. See Griffin v. Padilla, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1173 (E.D. Cal. 2019), vacated, No. 2:19-cv01477-MCE-DB, 2020 WL 1442091 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020).
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
15. See, e.g., Jackson C. Smith, Thornton & the Pursuit of the American Presidency, 43 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 39, 48 (2017) (“As with members of Congress, the Constitution is the exclusive source
of the qualifications to serve as President of the United States, and states are divested of power to
add qualifications to those already fixed within the Constitution.”); see also Griffin, 408 F. Supp.
3d at 1177–81 (concluding that SB 27 likely violated the Article II Qualifications Clause).
16. See Griffin, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1181–85.
17. See Patterson, 451 P.3d at 1191 (decisively nullifying SB 27).
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A. California’s Presidential Primary Clause Challenge
Article II, section 5(c) of the California Constitution states:
The Legislature shall provide for partisan elections for
presidential candidates, and political party and party central
committees, including an open presidential primary whereby
the candidates on the ballot are those found by the Secretary
of State to be recognized candidates throughout the nation
or throughout California for the office of President of the
United States, and those whose names are placed on the
ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate who has
withdrawn by filing an affidavit of noncandidacy.18
In Patterson v. Padilla,19 the California Supreme Court
interpreted this clause as establishing national or state recognition of
presidential candidacy as a sufficient, rather than necessary, condition
for ballot access.20 In other words, the California State Legislature
may not direct the Secretary of State to exclude from the ballot
someone who is “recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout
California” as a candidate “for the office of President of the United
States.”21 Such a person must appear on the primary ballot unless he
or she files an affidavit of noncandidacy.22 Because SB 27 purported
to exclude even nationally recognized presidential candidates from the
California primary ballot if they failed to release the last five years of
their income tax returns, its conflict with the California Constitution
rendered it invalid.23
The California Supreme Court noted that its ruling in Patterson
did not address any federal claims.24 However, one month before the
California Supreme Court invalidated SB 27 on California
constitutional grounds, a federal district court in Griffin v. Padilla25
issued a preliminary injunction against SB 27 on federal constitutional

18. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 5(c) (emphasis added).
19. 451 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2019).
20. See id. at 1179 (finding that the clause “is most naturally read as conveying a rule of
inclusivity for presidential primary elections that the Legislature cannot contravene”).
21. See id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. II, § 5(c)).
22. See id. at 1173.
23. See id. at 1179–80.
24. Id. at 1173 n.1.
25. 408 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2019), vacated, No. 2:19-cv-01477-MCE-DB, 2020 WL
1442091 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020).
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grounds.26 In doing so, the district court determined that SB 27 likely
violated the Article II Qualifications Clause as well as the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.27 If its reasoning reflects the way the U.S.
Supreme Court would analyze the matter, laws like SB 27 in other
states may very well be unconstitutional. Therefore, the primary goal
of this Note is to examine alternatives to SB 27 that address not only
the California Presidential Primary Clause challenge, but the Federal
Qualifications Clause and First and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges as well.
B. Qualifications Clause Challenge
The Article II Qualifications Clause of the Federal Constitution
states:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President;
neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall
not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.28
The Qualifications Clause challenge to SB 27 centered around the
contention that the clause enumerates an exclusive set of requirements
for the presidency, and that SB 27 unconstitutionally expanded this set
of requirements by mandating that presidential candidates release their
tax returns.29 Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held
26. See id. at 1173.
27. Id. at 1177–85.
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
29. See Griffin, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1180. SB 27 had the added wrinkle in that it applied to
primary elections rather than general elections. The U.S. Constitution makes no mention of primary
elections, and constitutional limitations on a state’s authority to regulate the general election
arguably do not apply to presidential primaries, especially when political parties are in many
instances free to ignore the results of such primaries. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 486–
91 (1975) (finding that a state court’s injunction refusing to seat party-selected delegates in favor
of elected delegates violated “the Party’s right to determine the composition of its National
Convention in accordance with Party standards”); Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex
rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981) (holding that Wisconsin “cannot require . . . delegates to
the National Party Convention vote there in accordance with the primary results, if to do so would
violate Party rules”). But the Supreme Court has held that the right to participate in primaries “is
protected just as is the right to vote at the election, where the primary is by law made an integral
part of the election machinery.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941); see also Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661–62 (1994) (“[T]he right to vote in such a primary for the
nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote in a general
election, is a right secured by the Constitution.”). In fact, the Court has specifically applied the
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the Article II requirements to be exclusive, the Court in U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton30 found the Article I requirements for
congressional office31 to be exclusive, 32 and much of the reasoning in
U.S. Term Limits applies to presidential elections as well.33
However, while the States likely cannot impose additional
substantive qualifications to the presidency, the Court has upheld
“generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the
integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.”34 The
constitutionality of SB 27 under Article II therefore hinges on whether
the tax return requirement constitutes a substantive qualification for
which Article II already provides an exhaustive list, or merely a
procedural rule necessary to facilitate the choosing of the President.35
For example, the Court has allowed states to impose filing deadlines,36
minimum signature requirements,37 and primary election
requirements38 as preconditions for ballot access. Because these types
of regulations prevent “voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the

Article I Qualifications Clause to primary election law. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,
479 U.S. 208, 227 (1986) (“[W]e hold that the Qualifications Clauses of Article I, § 2, and the
Seventeenth Amendment are applicable to primary elections in precisely the same fashion that they
apply to general congressional elections.”). It is therefore unlikely that SB 27’s application only to
primary elections would have made a meaningful difference under federal constitutional analysis.
30. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”).
32. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 827.
33. The U.S. Term Limits Court noted in dicta that the States “have just as much right, and no
more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president.” Id. at 803
(quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH
A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES,
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF CONSTITUTION 434–35 (3d ed. 1858)).
34. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983).
35. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 826–38 (stating that the Framers “intended to grant
States authority to protect the integrity and regularity of the election process by regulating election
procedures, . . . not to provide them with license to impose substantive qualifications”).
36. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438 (1971) (finding that Georgia’s early filing
deadline “for candidates not endorsed by established parties” was reasonable).
37. See id. at 442 (upholding a Georgia law requiring that presidential candidates from minorparties obtain signatures from 5 percent of eligible voters); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S.
767, 787 (1974) (upholding a similar Texas law).
38. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 190–91 (1986) (upholding a
Washington law requiring that a minor-party candidate receive at least 1 percent of the votes cast
in the primary election).
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presence of frivolous candidacies,”39 they serve as procedural
requirements necessary for the administration of elections rather than
restrictions on candidacy.
Some do not view a tax return requirement as fundamentally
different from any other procedural requirement.40 A tax return
requirement attempts to prevent voter confusion by providing voters
with information relevant to their choice for president.41 And it
prevents the presence of frivolous candidates by ensuring that
candidates commit to a minimum level of transparency.42 Moreover, a
tax return requirement can be viewed as a procedural step that does
not exclude any particular class of candidates—anyone can in theory
release his or her tax returns as a step towards candidacy.43
However, others find the relationship between requiring the
release of tax returns and the mechanics of running an election to be
much more tenuous.44 The 2016 election involved a nonfrivolous
major-party candidate who deliberately refused to release his tax
returns, and it is unclear how the release of his tax returns would have
benefitted any election procedure. Additionally, the Court in U.S.
Term Limits had invalidated a ballot access restriction for having “the
likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and [having] the
sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly.”45 Some
point out that laws like SB 27 clearly disadvantage President Trump,
and that the purpose of such laws seems to be less about providing
voters with relevant information and more about adding a qualification
that Trump has yet to satisfy.46 Because SB 27 did not appear to be

39. Id. at 195.
40. See Danielle Lang, Candidate Disclosure and Ballot Access Bills: Novel Questions on
Voting and Disclosure, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 46, 46 (2017).
41. See id. at 60.
42. See id. at 48 (“[M]ost serious candidates for the presidency have released their tax returns
for public inspection.”).
43. See id. at 56.
44. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, Weaponizing the Ballot, FLA. STATE U. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3450649.
45. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 836 (1995).
46. A California bill similar to SB 27 and introduced in 2017 explicitly referenced Donald
Trump. S.B. 149, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (as introduced Jan. 18, 2017) (“Donald
Trump’s refusal to release his income tax returns departed from decades of established political
tradition . . . .”). Ballot access legislation introduced in New York was titled the Tax Returns
Uniformly Made Public Act, or “TRUMP” Act. S.B. 26, 2017–2018 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
Similar legislation in Minnesota adopted the same title. S.B. 199, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2019).
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procedural in either nature or intent, they conclude that California
exceeded its constitutional authority by enacting it.47
C. First and Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
Analysis into the federal constitutionality of SB 27 does not end
with Article II. Even if SB 27 fell within the ambit of a state’s power
to regulate elections, it may nevertheless have infringed upon the First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of candidates and voters. First and
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to election laws generally involve
the alleged infringement of three categories of rights: the First
Amendment right to speech,48 the First Amendment right to
association and belief,49 and the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection.50 For example, the Supreme Court has held restrictions on
campaign expenditures to infringe upon a candidate’s First
Amendment right to speech because they limit a candidate’s means for
political communication.51 Additionally, the Court has found the
disclosure of campaign contributions to overly burden voters’ First
Amendment right to association when such disclosure results in actual
harassment against voters over their support for unpopular
campaigns.52 Finally, the Court has struck down election laws that
disadvantage a class of candidates—by imposing discriminatory ballot

47. See Muller, supra note 44, at 68–69.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”). The First Amendment right to speech was subsequently incorporated against the
states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
49. Although the right to association and belief is not explicitly mentioned in the First
Amendment, the Court referenced such a right and applied it to the states in National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
51. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1976) (striking down portions of the Federal
Elections Campaign Act that placed dollar limits on campaign expenditures); see also Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) (invalidating portions of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that limited independent corporate expenditures for
electioneering communications).
52. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 101–02 (1982)
(finding that the disclosure of the names and addresses of donors to the Socialist Workers party
violated those donors’ associational rights in light of the well-documented instances of harassment
against supporters of the Party); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792–93 (1983)
(holding that Ohio’s early filing deadline for independent candidates unconstitutionally burdened
the First Amendment right of voters to associate with the candidate of their choice); Patterson, 357
U.S. at 462–63 (finding that Alabama’s attempt to compel the disclosure of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) membership list
unconstitutionally burdened the associational rights of NAACP members).
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designations,53 filing deadlines,54 signature requirements,55 and filing
fees56—for violating that class of candidates’ Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection.
However, “not every limitation or incidental burden on [these
rights] is subject to a stringent standard of review.”57 Anderson v.
Celebrezze58 articulated a balancing test for courts to use when
subjecting ballot access restrictions to First and Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny.59 Under this test, courts must weigh the
“character and magnitude” of the First and Fourteenth Amendment
burdens imposed by the law against the “legitimacy and strength” of
the state’s interest in having it.60 The Court later reframed the same
test in Burdick v. Takushi,61 holding that “when [First and Fourteenth
Amendment] rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the
regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance.’”62 “Lesser burdens, however, trigger less
exacting review . . . .”63
Ample disagreement exists as to how SB 27 would have fared
under the Anderson-Burdick test. Some argue that any burden its
disclosure requirements place on candidates would be minimal, since
candidates have been disclosing tax returns for the better part of a
century.64 Others note that some candidates have unique privacy
interests that cannot be properly weighed by the courts.65 And it is not
53. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403–04 (1964) (invalidating a Louisiana law
requiring the designation of a candidate’s race on the ballot).
54. See Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 805–06 (invalidating Ohio’s early filing deadline for
independent candidates).
55. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183–87 (1979)
(striking down an Illinois law requiring that independent and new party candidates for statewide
offices obtain signatures totaling 5 percent of the votes cast in the prior election); Norman v. Reed,
502 U.S. 279, 288–94 (1992) (striking down portions of a similar Illinois law); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 24–25 (1968) (striking down an Ohio law requirement that a new party’s presidential
nominee obtain signatures totaling 15 percent of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial election).
56. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (striking down a Texas statutory scheme
requiring candidates to pay fees as high as $8,900).
57. Id. at 143.
58. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
59. See id. at 789.
60. See id.
61. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
62. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
63. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (citing Burdick, 504
U.S. at 434).
64. See Lang, supra note 40, at 60.
65. See Muller, supra note 44, at 9 n.33.
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difficult to imagine disagreements about the “legitimacy and strength”
of the state’s interest in releasing a candidate’s tax returns. On the one
hand, laws like SB 27 allow voters to make more intelligent decisions
when choosing the next leader of the country.66 On the other hand,
most serious candidates are already subject to intense media scrutiny,
and voters are in any case free to draw inferences from a candidate’s
refusal to release his or her tax returns.67 Some have additionally noted
that disclosure may not provide the educational benefits touted by
lawmakers—few voters may bother to educate themselves about
candidate tax returns, and the information contained in candidate tax
returns may distract voters from more important substantive issues. 68
Although the arguments enumerated above are far from
comprehensive, they demonstrate that the constitutionality of laws like
SB 27 remains uncertain absent a more definitive ruling by the
Supreme Court.
III. IMPOSING CIVIL OR CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CANDIDATES WHO
FAIL TO RELEASE THEIR TAX RETURNS
SB 27 attempted to motivate the disclosure of tax returns by
restricting access to the ballot.69 Although the California Supreme
Court has since struck down SB 27,70 California can still incentivize
disclosure by imposing civil or criminal penalties on those presidential
candidates who fail to produce their tax returns. By avoiding the ballot,
such an approach will not only sidestep challenges based on the
California Constitution, it will likely bypass challenges based on the
Qualifications Clause and withstand First and Fourteenth Amendment
scrutiny as well. The remainder of this Part addresses each of the
federal constitutional challenges in turn.

66. See S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
67. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 797–98 (1983) (“Our cases reflect a greater
faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues. . . . This
reasoning applies with even greater force to a Presidential election, which receives more intense
publicity.”).
68. See Lear Jiang, Note, Disclosure’s Last Stand? The Need to Clarify the “Informational
Interest” Advanced by Campaign Finance Disclosure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 487, 501–06 (2019).
69. S.B. 27.
70. See Patterson v. Padilla, 451 P.3d 1171, 1191 (Cal. 2019).
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A. Qualifications Clause Challenge
If laws like SB 27 violate the Presidential Qualifications Clause,
it is because their denial of ballot access constitutes a disqualification
of candidates for reasons other than those permitted by Article II.71
However, California and other states can sidestep the Qualifications
Clause issue altogether by civilly or criminally sanctioning the
nondisclosure of tax returns instead of conditioning ballot access on
their production. Although the Constitution fixes the qualifications for
President and members of Congress,72 it permits states to punish
behavior it neither spells out nor anticipates.73 In fact, the government
has on a few occasions imprisoned those it could not otherwise
disqualify from candidacy. In 1798, Representative Matthew Lyon
was convicted for violating the Alien and Sedition Acts.74 Despite
being sentenced to prison, Lyon was re-elected to Congress in a
landslide vote while sitting inside his jail cell.75 Over a century later,
in 1919, the Supreme Court upheld Eugene Debs’s conviction under
the Espionage Act.76 Debs nevertheless ran for President while serving
his ten-year prison sentence and received close to one million votes in
the 1920 election.77
The upshot is that even a law criminalizing a candidate’s refusal
to release his or her tax returns will almost certainly withstand Article
II scrutiny. The penalties imposed by such a law do not disqualify a
candidate from the presidency—as history has demonstrated, one can
still mount a successful campaign from prison. But more importantly,
the Framers never intended the Presidential and Congressional
Qualifications Clauses to serve as limitations to state police power. If
the impediment of being in prison amounted to a disqualification from
office in violation of the Qualifications Clauses, the constitutionality
of every criminal code would be called into question.

71. See supra Part II.B.
72. See supra Part II.B.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
74. J. FAIRFAX MCLAUGHLIN, MATTHEW LYON: THE HAMPDEN OF CONGRESS, A
BIOGRAPHY 357–58 (1900).
75. Lyon received 4,576 votes; his challenger received 2,444. Id. at 374–75.
76. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
77. Debs received 913,693 votes, the highest ever for a socialist candidate. RHODRI JEFFREYSJONES, THE AMERICAN LEFT: ITS IMPACT ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY S INCE 1900, at 35 (2013).
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It might be argued that a better reading of the Qualifications
Clauses would limit only those laws that single out political candidates
for sanction while leaving untouched laws of general applicability that
happen to ensnare those running for office. However, the Court has
thus far refused to recognize such a distinction. For example, the Court
has generally upheld the civil and criminal penalties imposed by the
disclosure provisions of federal campaign finance laws—applicable
only to candidates for federal office—without so much as a single
mention of the Qualifications Clauses. 78 And if the targeted imposition
of civil or criminal penalties by Congress does not implicate the
Qualifications Clauses, neither should the same by the states.79
B. First and Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
Although a law that substitutes SB 27’s ballot removal with civil
or criminal sanctions may avoid Qualifications Clause scrutiny, it
remains susceptible to the same First and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges. Because such a law still requires the disclosure of
candidate tax returns, it may discourage charitable contributions and
other associational activity revealed by the returns, or even deter
candidates from running for office altogether. It therefore implicates
what the Supreme Court has sometimes referred to as the First
Amendment right to “privacy of association and belief.”80
Nevertheless, the Court’s decisions upholding the mandatory
disclosure of election-related information suggest that both SB 27 and
its potential replacement would likely survive First and Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny.81
78. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–68 (1976) (upholding the disclosure provisions
of the Federal Election Campaign Act); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
366–71 (2010) (upholding the disclosure provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act);
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 230–31 (2003) (upholding earlier disclosure
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Of course, the Supreme Court’s lack of
commentary about the constitutionality of federal campaign finance laws under the Qualifications
Clauses is not conclusive. Nevertheless, it suggests that even the attorneys seeking to overturn the
statutes did not find the Qualifications Clause arguments persuasive enough to include in their
briefs, and that the Court did not find the laws so obviously violative of the Qualifications Clauses
as to raise the issue sua sponte.
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
80. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
81. This Note takes a different position than at least one federal district court, which found
that SB 27 would likely have violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Griffin v. Padilla,
408 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1181–85 (E.D. Cal. 2019), vacated, No. 2:19-cv-01477-MCE-DB, 2020 WL
1442091 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020).
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1. Campaign Finance Laws
In analyzing the constitutionality of a law compelling the
disclosure of candidate income tax returns, it is instructive to look at
how the Supreme Court has considered, and ultimately upheld, the
disclosure provisions of federal campaign finance laws.82 The most
notable of these laws is the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).
First enacted in 1972, it currently stands as the primary source of
federal law regulating campaign spending and fundraising.83 Among
other things, it requires candidates to report independent expenditures
if they exceed $250 in a calendar year,84 and to disclose the names,
addresses, and occupations of donors who contribute more than
$200.85 These reports are subsequently made available to the public
on a website.86 The FECA also established the Federal Election
Commission (FEC)87 and gave it the authority to institute civil actions
against those who fail to make the requisite disclosures.88 In addition
to seeking injunctive relief, the FEC can impose civil penalties not
exceeding “the greater of $5,000 or an amount equal to any
contribution or expenditure involved in such violation.”89 In the case
of a knowing or willful violation, the ceiling increases to “the greater
of $10,000 or an amount equal to 200 percent of any contribution or
expenditure involved in such violation.”90 In some instances, the FEC
can even petition the court to impose criminal sanctions.91
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974
included a provision that allowed the disqualification of candidates for
campaign finance violations.92 Tellingly, Congress repealed this

82. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60–68 (upholding the disclosure provisions of the Federal
Election Campaign Act); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–71 (upholding the disclosure provisions
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 230–31 (upholding earlier
disclosure provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act).
83. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–46).
84. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1) (2018).
85. Id. § 30104(c)(2).
86. Id. § 30104(i)(4).
87. Id. § 30106.
88. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(A).
89. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(B).
90. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(C).
91. Id. § 30109(a)(11).
92. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 407, 88 Stat.
1263, 1290 (repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94283, § 111, 90 Stat. 475, 486).
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provision in 197693 before the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
consider it, likely because of its dubious constitutionality.94 However,
the Court has since affirmed the constitutionality of the remaining
enforcement provisions of the FECA, including the authority of the
FEC to impose civil and criminal sanctions for a candidate’s failure to
file the requisite campaign finance disclosures.95
a. Buckley v. Valeo
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of the
FECA in Buckley v. Valeo.96 Although it struck down portions of the
FECA that imposed hard limits on election-related expenditures made
by candidates and their campaigns,97 the Court broadly upheld the
FECA’s reporting requirements.98 The Court reasoned that
expenditure ceilings impose a far greater burden on First Amendment
political expression and associational rights than reporting
requirements do.99 The former “necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”100 To the
extent the latter does so, it does so indirectly.101 The Court therefore
subjected the FECA’s expenditure limits to strict scrutiny102 while
taking a more lenient approach to its reporting requirements.103
This does not mean, however, that compelled disclosure is not
subject to any scrutiny. Although mandating the disclosure of
contributions and expenditures does not prohibit political expression
or association in an absolute sense, it “can seriously infringe on
93. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 § 111.
94. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 115 n.157, 137 n.175 (1976) (noting that candidate
disqualification powers pose “very serious constitutional questions,” but that “[c]onsiderations of
ripeness prevent us from deciding . . . whether such an agency could . . . disqualify a candidate for
federal election consistently with Art. I, § 5, cl. 1”).
95. Id. at 76–82.
96. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
97. Id. at 51–59.
98. Id. at 143.
99. Id. at 44.
100. Id. at 19.
101. Id. at 64.
102. The Buckley Court used the words “exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 16. The Court later clarified
that “exacting scrutiny” in the context of expenditure limits meant strict scrutiny. McCutcheon v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 197 (2014) (“Under exacting scrutiny, the Government may
regulate protected speech only if such regulation promotes a compelling interest and is the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”).
103. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
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privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”104 Because campaign contributions “can reveal much
about a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs,”105 their
disclosure—although not an outright ban on the contributions
themselves—may nevertheless deter some individuals from making
contributions, thereby indirectly interfering with their First
Amendment right to associate with the campaign of their choice.106
Accordingly, the Buckley Court reaffirmed a form of intermediate
scrutiny for mandatory disclosure laws, which “cannot be justified by
a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest” and for
which there must “be a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’
between the governmental interest and the information required to be
disclosed.”107 With respect to the FECA, the Court found three
categories of government interest that justified its disclosure
requirements.108 First, the disclosure requirements aid voters in their
selection of a candidate by giving them insight into the source and uses
of campaign money.109 Second, the disclosure requirements
discourage corruption and the appearance of corruption by subjecting
campaign finances to public scrutiny.110 Finally, the disclosure
requirements are necessary for the government to be able to enforce
the other provisions of the FECA.111
In closing out its analysis of the FECA, the Court asserted that the
disclosure provisions were not only substantially related to the
government interests enumerated above, they were “in most
applications . . . the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of
campaign ignorance and corruption.”112 Although opponents of the
FECA had proposed a rule requiring post-election disclosure by
successful candidates as a less restrictive alternative, the Court
dismissed the proposal as being ineffective at educating voters prior
to the election when “public interest in sources of campaign funds is
104. Id.
105. Id. at 66 (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
106. Id. at 68.
107. Id. at 64.
108. Id. at 66.
109. Id. at 67 (“It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely
than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.”).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 67–68.
112. Id. at 68.
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likely to be at its peak.”113 Because the Court concluded that the FECA
reporting requirements served important government interests, not
least of which was the electorate’s interest in knowing “where political
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate,”114
the Court found them constitutional.115
However, the Court was careful to note that its decision in
Buckley did not mean that the FECA reporting requirements were
necessarily constitutional in all their applications.116 For example,
compelling disclosure from a minor-party candidate when such
disclosure would subject minor-party contributors to “threats,
harassment, or reprisals” may more directly abridge the contributors’
First Amendment associational rights.117 In such instances, disclosure
might serve as a practical bar to the contributors’ ability to donate to
the party of their choice.118 Nevertheless, the Court found these
concerns sufficiently remote so as not to facially invalidate compelled
disclosure laws that failed to carve out exceptions for minor-party
candidates and was satisfied that the lower courts could adequately
address the constitutional issues in such cases as they arose.119
b. Defining the Limits of Buckley
The Buckley decision upholding the FECA’s disclosure
provisions relied on two important findings. First, that the disclosure
provisions, unlike the FECA’s expenditure limits, only indirectly
burdened the First Amendment rights of candidates and their donors
and therefore triggered a more lenient form of scrutiny.120 And second,
that the disclosure provisions satisfied scrutiny by being substantially
related to serving important government interests.121 Even as the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed its decision in Buckley,122 it has

113. Id. at 68 n.82.
114. Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 61.
116. See id. at 74.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 73–74.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 64.
121. Id. at 68 (“The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial
governmental interests.”).
122. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–71 (2010)
(upholding the disclosure provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act); McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 230–31 (2003) (upholding earlier disclosure provisions of the
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subsequently invalidated some disclosure laws as lacking in one or the
other of these justifications.123
The Buckley Court opened the door to the invalidation of
mandatory disclosure laws that encroach too far on protected First
Amendment interests,124 and the Court subsequently walked through
that door in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee
(Ohio).125 There, an Ohio law required political parties to report the
names and addresses of every campaign contributor and every
recipient of a campaign disbursement.126 As such, it did not differ
materially from the FECA.127 Nevertheless, the Court held the
reporting requirements unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist
Workers Party (SWP).128 Evidence presented at trial documented a
long history of both private and government hostility towards the
SWP.129 The former involved numerous instances of threatening
phone calls, hate mail, and the firing of SWP members because of their
party affiliation.130 The latter involved pervasive surveillance of SWP
members by various government agencies, and the disclosure of
embarrassing information about SWP members to the press.131
Relying primarily on its reasoning in Buckley, the Court held that
because there existed a “reasonable probability” that disclosure would
subject SWP contributors and recipients to “threats, harassment, or
reprisals,” Ohio’s disclosure laws could not be constitutionally applied
to the SWP.132
Even when there is no reason to believe that disclosure would lead
to “threats, harassment, or reprisals,” the Court has found legislation
unconstitutional for lacking a substantial relation to its stated

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
123. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982),
discussed infra; Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999), discussed infra.
124. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
125. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
126. Id. at 88.
127. It was argued that the Ohio statute’s lack of a monetary threshold, in contrast to the FECA,
should render the statute facially invalid. However, the district court punted on the issue. Id. at 91
n.6.
128. Id. at 88.
129. Id. at 99.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 101–02.
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government interests.133 In Colorado, citizens can enact laws through
ballot measures that have garnered a minimum number of supporting
signatures.134 It is therefore common for proponents of ballot measures
to hire petition circulators to solicit signatures.135 In an attempt to
regulate signature solicitation activities, Colorado passed a law
requiring the disclosure of the names, addresses, and salaries of paid
petition circulators.136 But in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, Inc.,137 the Court ruled the law unconstitutional, not
because it could reasonably lead to the harassment of petition
circulators,138 but because it failed scrutiny.139
The Court acknowledged that disclosure generally serves
important government interests, observing that “informed public
opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.”140
However, the Court found Colorado’s interest in disclosure to be
adequately served by existing law requiring proponents of ballot
measures—rather than the petition circulators they hire—to report
their names and the amount of money they spent to gather
signatures.141 After all, “[w]hat is of interest is the payor, not the
payees.”142 The Court further dismissed concerns that paid petition
circulators may accept false signatures, reasoning that they would
have less incentive to do so than non-paid petition circulators who
were not subject to the disclosure requirement.143 Because the sweep
of the Colorado provision was simultaneously too broad—
unnecessarily including paid petition circulators when the inclusion of
ballot measure proponents would suffice—and too narrow—failing to
133. See Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 204 (1999), discussed infra.
134. Id. at 186.
135. See id. at 194.
136. See id. at 186.
137. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
138. The disclosure of the names, addresses, and salaries of petition circulators “are not
instantly accessible” and therefore “does not expose the circulator to the risk of ‘heat of the
moment’ harassment.” Id. at 199.
139. Id. at 204.
140. Id. at 202 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
141. Id. at 202–03.
142. Id. at 203 (quoting Am. Const. L. Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 870 F. Supp. 995, 1003 (D. Colo.
1994), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 120 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1997)).
143. “[W]e are not prepared to assume that a professional circulator—whose qualifications for
similar future assignments may well depend on a reputation for competence and integrity—is any
more likely to accept false signatures than a volunteer who is motivated entirely by an interest in
having the proposition placed on the ballot.” Id. at 203–04 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,
426 (1988)).
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include non-paid petition circulators who might have more incentive
to obtain false signatures—the Court struck it down for being too
“tenuously related to the substantial interests disclosure serves.”144
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,145 the Court struck
down a disclosure law both because it overly burdened the First
Amendment rights of ordinary citizens and because it failed to serve
important state interests.146 There, Margaret McIntyre was fined for
distributing anonymous leaflets protesting a proposed school tax147 in
contravention of an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of
“unsigned documents designed to influence voters in an election.”148
The Court took several steps to distinguish this case from Buckley.149
First, whereas the disclosure law in Buckley required the
attachment of names to campaign contributions, the Ohio law required
the attachment of names to all election-related documents, including,
in this instance, “a personally crafted statement of a political
viewpoint.”150 While “money may ‘talk,’” the speech communicated
by a campaign contribution is “less specific, less personal, and less
provocative than a handbill.”151 There is therefore less of a risk that
campaign donation attributions will significantly impact donors.152 On
the other hand, because leaflets like the ones passed out by McIntyre
may express unpopular viewpoints and are therefore much more likely
to “precipitate retaliation,” the Ohio law infringed upon McIntyre’s
free speech rights to an impermissible degree.153
Second, while disclosure of campaign contributions lessens the
risk that the contributions will be used to solicit special treatment after
a candidate assumes office,154 disclosure of campaign literature

144. Id. at 204.
145. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
146. See id. at 357.
147. Id. at 337–38.
148. Id. at 344.
149. Id. at 355–56.
150. Id. at 355.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See id. Presumably, the Court was also sympathetic to the fact that McIntyre had only
“modest resources” at her disposal. See id. at 350. The Court has since upheld a provision of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act requiring anyone funding televised electioneering
communications to include the disclaimer “_______ is responsible for the content of this
advertising.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (quoting 2
U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2) (2000) (transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30120(d)(2) (2012))).
154. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356.
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authorship serves no similar government interest.155 Although the
Court acknowledged Ohio’s stated interest in preventing fraud and
libel, it noted that Ohio’s Election Code already penalized the
dissemination of false statements during political campaigns.156
Accordingly, the law in question only provided the ancillary benefits
of further deterring fraud and aiding the enforcement of the Election
Code.157 These benefits, while “assuredly legitimate,” were not
sufficiently important to justify the law’s burden on political
speech.158
Taken as a whole, these cases suggest that the government may
generally compel the disclosure of election-related information unless
doing so would subject individuals to a more than hypothetical
possibility of retaliation, or if such disclosure does not substantially
relate to the accomplishment of important government interests—
typically voter education and the deterrence of corruption or its
appearance.159
2. More Comprehensive Financial Disclosure Laws
The cases discussed above establish a framework for analyzing
reporting requirements as applied to election-related activity, but they
fail to address the constitutionality of laws requiring the disclosure of
personal financial information that predates a candidate’s decision to
run for office. Indeed, the Court has thus far eschewed ruling on laws
requiring public officials to disclose a broader range of non-campaignrelated finances.
The most prominent of these more comprehensive disclosure
laws is the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (EGA).160 Among other
things, the EGA requires the President and Vice President to publicly
report their sources of income, gifts they have received, property they
hold, the value of their total liabilities, and their sale and exchange of
real property or securities.161 These reports must be filed within thirty

155. Id. at 357.
156. Id. at 349.
157. Id. at 350–51.
158. Id. at 351.
159. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
160. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. app. 4).
161. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 101(f), 102(a), 103(d) (2018).
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days of assuming office162 and on an annual basis thereafter.163
Although the constitutionality of these particular provisions has yet to
be seriously challenged in federal court, the Fifth Circuit in Duplantier
v. United States164 upheld other EGA provisions requiring federal
judges, their spouses, and their dependent children to file and make
public similar financial reports.165 The Fifth Circuit based its
reasoning primarily on its prior decision in Plante v. Gonzalez.166
a. Plante v. Gonzalez
In Plante v. Gonzalez, the Fifth Circuit upheld the “Sunshine
Amendment” to the Florida Constitution.167 The amendment states in
relevant part:
All elected constitutional officers and candidates for such
offices and, as may be determined by law, other public
officers, candidates, and employees shall file full and public
disclosure of their financial interests. . . . Full and public
disclosure of financial interests shall mean filing with the
custodian of state records by July 1 of each year a sworn
statement showing net worth and identifying each asset and
liability in excess of $1,000 and its value together with one
of the following:
a. A copy of the person’s most recent federal income tax
return; or
b. A sworn statement which identifies each separate
source and amount of income which exceeds $1,000.168
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit first declined to find that the
Florida amendment’s compelled financial disclosure infringed on any
“fundamental” right.169 It noted that the rights the Supreme Court has
traditionally classified as “fundamental” have all involved interests in
important and intimate decision-making.170 Although financial
disclosure may indirectly affect some of the decisions one might

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. § 101(a).
Id. § 101(d).
606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 657.
575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978); see Duplantier, 606 F.2d at 669–71.
Plante, 575 F.2d at 1121–22.
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8.
Plante, 575 F.2d at 1132.
See id. at 1128.
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make, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the impacted decisions are
typically not as important or intimate as the ones the Supreme Court
has protected171—for example, the decision to use contraceptives,172
to terminate a pregnancy,173 to marry,174 to live with family,175 or to
control the upbringing of one’s children.176 Moreover, even when
disclosure does affect important and intimate decision-making, the
Fifth Circuit declared its influence too incidental to pose a
constitutional problem.177
The Supreme Court had considered the secondary effects of
disclosure in two prior cases. In Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth,178 the Court upheld abortion-related reporting
requirements over objections that it discouraged women from
exercising their right to terminate their pregnancies.179 And in Whalen
v. Roe,180 the Court upheld a drug prescription recordkeeping system
over objections that it would dissuade some from making decisions
important to their medical care.181 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
because the Sunshine Amendment did little more to deter the exercise
of a fundamental right than the provisions in Danforth or Whalen, it
did not demand strict scrutiny.182
However, the Fifth Circuit recognized a constitutionally protected
interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters” apart from the
ancillary effects such disclosure might have on decision-making.183
Although the Supreme Court in Whalen seemed to disclaim a
generalized interest in privacy by permitting the recording of the
names and addresses of patients in a state-controlled computer
171. See id.
172. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
173. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
174. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Obergefell v. Hodges, 567 U.S. 644 (2015).
175. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
176. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
177. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1131 (5th Cir. 1978).
178. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
179. Id. at 79.
180. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
181. Id. at 602–04.
182. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1131–32. The Sunshine Amendment has an arguably greater deterrent
effect than the laws in Danforth and Whalen because unlike those laws, it requires the relevant
disclosures be made accessible to the public. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit is likely correct in
finding that any increased deterrence resulting from public disclosure is unlikely to trigger strict
scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence.
183. Id. at 1132–34.
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database without applying any form of heightened scrutiny,184 the
Fifth Circuit distinguished Whalen from the circumstances in
Plante.185 The Court in Whalen had dismissed concerns over privacy
in large part because public disclosure of the information stored in the
database was prohibited186 and the possibility of unauthorized access
was unlikely.187 But when, as in Plante, a case involves the disclosure
of personal information to the public—as opposed to state
employees—the Fifth Circuit determined that the larger intrusion to
privacy demanded some form of scrutiny.188 The court feared that any
other interpretation of privacy rights would result in the unwelcome
potential for Florida’s public disclosure requirements to be “extended
to anyone, in any situation.”189
The Fifth Circuit eventually decided that the constitutionality of
the Sunshine Amendment was best determined by “comparing the
interests it serves with those it hinders.”190 In assessing the
government’s interests, the court pointed to four important goals
similar to the ones laid out in Buckley: “the public’s ‘right to know’ an
official’s interests, deterrence of corruption and conflicting interests,
creation of public confidence in Florida’s officials, and assistance in
detecting and prosecuting officials who have violated the law.”191 The
court subsequently found the Florida amendment to sufficiently
promote the first three of these goals.192
In addressing the interests of candidates and public officials, the
court acknowledged that in some situations financial disclosure may
lead to “the threat of kidnapping, the irritation of solicitations, [or] the
embarrassment of poverty.”193 Presumably, a showing of a legitimate
threat of kidnapping would result in a successful as-applied challenge.
But as a general matter, the court held these concerns insufficient to
overcome the government’s interests in enacting the amendment, in
part because public officials and those running for public office have
184. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598 (“[T]he legislature’s enactment of the patient-identification
requirement was a reasonable exercise of New York’s broad police powers.”).
185. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1133.
186. Id. (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593–95).
187. Id. (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602).
188. Id. at 1134.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1134–35.
193. Id. at 1135 (citing City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 233 (Cal. 1970)).
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less of an expectation of privacy,194 and in part because “regulations
might allow exemptions in sensitive situations.”195 Because the Fifth
Circuit found the balancing test to tilt in Florida’s favor, it deemed the
Sunshine Amendment constitutional.196
b. State and lower federal court decisions on financial disclosure
Financial disclosure laws similar to the EGA and Florida’s
Sunshine Amendment have worked their way through various state
and lower federal courts.197 The majority of these cases have upheld
financial disclosure laws as applied to public officials,198 but not all of
them have arrived at their conclusions in the same way.
In Hunter v. City of New York,199 a New York state court found
that because a city financial disclosure ordinance200 did not implicate
a constitutional right, “the test is whether the means employed . . . are
‘reasonable and appropriate’ to accomplish its legitimate purposes.”201
Unsurprisingly, the court held the ordinance constitutional under this
lenient form of review even in “the absence of administrative
machinery to review the propriety of public disclosure in individual
cases.”202 However, while the state appellate court agreed that the law
did not infringe on any constitutional right to privacy, it held that the
law violated the Due Process Clause by not considering “claims of
irrelevancy.”203 Although the law in most cases served legitimate
government purposes, its flaw was in its failure to provide state
employees the opportunity to argue that, as applied to them, the law’s
disclosure requirement bore no relationship to these purposes.204
194. For example, “[t]he salaries of most officials, including federal judges, are matters of
public record.” Id. at 1136.
195. Id. at 1137.
196. Id. at 1138.
197. See id. at 1124 n.8 (listing the rulings on disclosure laws in fourteen states).
198. See id. at 1136 n.26 (listing cases from a “majority of courts” holding that “mandatory
financial disclosure for elected officials is constitutional”).
199. 391 N.Y.S.2d 289 (N.Y. Special Term 1976), aff’d as modified, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977), aff’d, 376 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y. 1978) (mem.).
200. Id. at 297. The ordinance required officials and their spouses to report any income from a
single source exceeding $1,000, any gifts exceeding $500, any debts exceeding $5,000 over a
ninety-day period, and any investment whose value exceeded $20,000. Id. at 294.
201. Id. at 297.
202. Id. at 301.
203. See Hunter v. City of New York, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189–90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), aff’d,
376 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y. 1978) (mem.).
204. See id. at 189 (“The State must provide appropriate procedures to avoid arbitrary or
discriminatory results, even where it asserts a legitimate governmental interest.”).
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In Slevin v. City of New York,205 a district court enjoined
enforcement of a newer version of the same financial disclosure law,
but for different reasons.206 It found the law to implicate “fundamental
interests,” including “the right to privacy, in its many facets, financial,
marital, familial . . . and freedom of association, of belief, and of
speech.”207 The court reasoned that such interests “should be justified
by at least substantial and perhaps compelling state interests” and
should be “narrowly drawn to deal only with the legitimate state
interests at stake.”208 The court additionally took issue with the fact
that the law still “provide[d] no mechanism by which reporting
employees may be spared from reporting any item arguably required
to be disclosed.”209
Slevin’s description of privacy rights as “fundamental” and its use
of language typically associated with strict scrutiny is somewhat of an
anomaly. By and large, courts have refrained from applying strict
scrutiny to financial disclosure laws.210 Nevertheless, courts seem to
be more willing to find such laws constitutional when they provide a
means by which some portions of financial disclosures can be
redacted.211 Although Slevin was not explicitly overturned, the Second
Circuit later upheld a third version of the same law that permitted
individuals to withhold items from their financial disclosure reports
when “public inspection would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy.”212 The court acknowledged that “public disclosure of
financial information may be personally embarrassing and highly
intrusive,” but determined that “the statute’s privacy mechanism
adequately protects plaintiffs’ constitutional privacy interests.”213
Courts have also been sensitive to the scope of financial
disclosure laws. In City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young,214 the

205. 477 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
206. See id. at 1052–53.
207. Id. at 1055.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1054.
210. See Louis Bernard Jack, Constitutional Aspects of Financial Disclosure Under the Ethics
in Government Act, 30 CATH. U. L. REV. 583, 586 (1981).
211. See Slevin, 477 F. Supp. at 1054.
212. Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1557 (2d Cir. 1983).
213. Id. at 1561. Beyond stating that the statute’s privacy mechanism was sufficient to ensure
the law’s constitutionality, the Second Circuit did not indicate whether it would have upheld the
statute’s original formulation in Slevin, or what the appropriate level of scrutiny should be.
214. 466 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1970).
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California Supreme Court found a financial disclosure law215 to be
overly broad because it applied to every public officer and candidate
for state or local office, as well as their spouses and minor children.216
The court decried the fact that “[n]o effort [was] made to relate the
disclosure to financial dealings or assets which might be expected to
give rise to a conflict of interest.”217 In a subsequent case, the
California Supreme Court upheld a disclosure law218 because it
contained “sufficient assurances that unnecessary intrusions into
personal privacy will not occur.”219 In particular, the law was
“applicable only to certain designated officials” and exempted from
disclosure any interest that could not be materially affected by an
official’s actions while in office.220
It is unclear how the U.S. Supreme Court would rule on similar
financial disclosure laws today. The majority of the state and lower
court cases considering these laws rely on a general interest in
informational privacy that the Court has yet to fully acknowledge or
disclaim.221 Moreover, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,222
the last Supreme Court case to directly address the “individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”223 was, like many of the
aforementioned cases, decided over forty years ago.224 However, if
Nixon can serve as a guide, the Court is likely to be sensitive to the
same issues discussed above. In Nixon, the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act, which directed the government to take custody of
presidential materials accumulated during the Nixon presidency in
order to preserve documents that had historical value and to make
215. The law required the disclosure of all investments valued in excess of $10,000. Id. at 232.
216. See id. at 232–33.
217. Id. at 232.
218. The law required the disclosure of investments worth more than $1,000, real property
worth more than $1,000, each source of income or gift worth more than $250, and employment in
the prior year. County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 522 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Cal. 1974).
219. Id. at 1350.
220. Id. at 1348.
221. See Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 146–47 (2011)
(acknowledging the dearth of case law on the matter, but nevertheless declining to rule on the
existence of a general right to informational privacy).
222. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
223. Id. at 457 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
224. See Nelson, 562 U.S. at 146 (“The Court announced the decision in Nixon in the waning
days of October Term 1976. Since then, the Court has said little else on the subject of an ‘individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’ . . . [And] no other decision has squarely
addressed a constitutional right to informational privacy.” (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599)).
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other records available for use in judicial proceedings.225 The Court
acknowledged that some of the materials in question might be personal
in nature, and that “public officials, including the President, are not
wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of
personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public
capacity.”226 Nevertheless, the Court found the Act constitutional in
part because it set clear limits on disclosure.227 In particular, the Act
required government archivists with “an unblemished record for
discretion”228 to prescreen the presidential materials and immediately
return any documents they flagged as “purely private.”229
While the boundary between laws that are too broad and those
that are sufficiently tailored is hardly clear and sometimes
inconsistent, a few themes stand out. First, courts have been more
amenable to laws that place some limits on disclosure. This might take
the form of administrative processes that allow affected persons to
withhold sensitive information230 or information bearing no
connection to their official duties.231 Many courts, however, set an
even lower bar, finding adequate “minimum dollar limits on revelation
of some of the assets and liabilities.”232 Second, courts are more likely
to uphold disclosure laws that extend only to a well-defined and
reasonable set of persons. In particular, courts prefer statutes that
apply only to higher public offices where the risk and consequence of
corruption is greater and the government interest is correspondingly
higher.233 Finally, courts have for the most part acknowledged that it
225. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 433–36.
226. Id. at 457.
227. Id. at 454.
228. Id. at 462 (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 406 F. Supp. 321, 365 (D.D.C. 1976),
aff’d, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)).
229. Id. at 458–59.
230. See S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (requiring the redaction of social security
numbers, home addresses, telephone numbers, and medical information on submitted tax returns).
231. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458–59 (stating that the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act required the government to return to President Nixon all “purely private papers
and recordings”).
232. Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 35, 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), aff’d, 383 A.2d 428
(N.J. 1978) (mem.).
233. See, e.g., Gideon v. Ala. State Ethics Comm’n, 379 So. 2d 570, 575 (Ala. 1980) (upholding
a disclosure requirement for officials who make more than $15,000 annually); Hunter v. City of
New York, 391 N.Y.S.2d 289, 302–03 (N.Y. Special Term 1976) (upholding a disclosure
requirement for officials earning more than $25,000 annually), aff’d as modified, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977), aff’d, 376 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y. 1978) (mem.); 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 101(f) (2018)
(requiring disclosure from a defined set of officials, including those in a position classified as GS15 or above). But see Comer v. City of Mobile, 337 So. 2d 742, 752–53 (Ala. 1976) (finding a
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would be “an insurmountable legislative task to tailor disclosures to
each of literally a myriad of public posts, and an anomaly to require
each individual to make a personal determination as to what items of
his financial affairs would be relevant.”234 Therefore, the consensus
among the courts has been that disclosure laws need not use the least
restrictive means for achieving compelling government interests.235
3. Applying the Anderson-Burdick Test
Although the Supreme Court established the Anderson-Burdick
test as a means for evaluating ballot access legislation rather than
disclosure laws, the test in many ways epitomizes the reasoning in
both Plante and Buckley. The initial formulation in Anderson
resembles the balancing test put forward by the Fifth Circuit in Plante,
requiring courts to weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments” against “the precise interests put forward by the State
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”236 More recent
formulations based on Burdick parallel the logic in Buckley, where
“[r]egulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs’ rights must be
narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest,” and
“[l]esser burdens . . . trigger less exacting review.”237 In Buckley, the
Court applied strict scrutiny to hard limits on campaign expenditures
because they severely burdened candidates’ First Amendment right to
speech.238 But the Court only applied intermediate scrutiny to
campaign finance disclosure requirements because they imposed a
lesser burden on donors’ First Amendment right to association.239
And even though the Fifth Circuit in Plante arrived at a balancing
test based on an ostensible constitutional interest in informational
privacy, the path it took to get there nevertheless bears a striking
resemblance to the approach taken in Buckley and formalized in
Burdick. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the submission of
financial records to the government generally imposes so little of a
disclosure ordinance that applied only to officials in cities with populations greater than 15,000
“arbitrary and capricious”).
234. Fritz v. Gorton, 517 P.2d 911, 926 (Wash. 1974).
235. See Jack, supra note 210, at 586.
236. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
237. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (citing Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
238. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
239. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).

(12) 54.1_TANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

ALTERNATIVES TO CALIFORNIA’S SB 27

2/13/21 2:18 PM

347

privacy burden that it warrants no more than rational basis review.240
But because the release of financial records to the public is particularly
invasive, the court reasoned that public disclosure requires
“[s]omething more than mere rationality.”241 On the other hand,
because the Supreme Court has not recognized a generalized
fundamental right to privacy, and because the Florida amendment did
not impose a severe burden to the types of “fundamental” personal
decision-making the Supreme Court has recognized, the Fifth Circuit
did not find the amendment to warrant the most exacting of scrutiny.242
The resulting standard established by the Fifth Circuit therefore falls
somewhere between rational basis review and strict scrutiny.243
a. Standard of review
The logic of Anderson-Burdick can similarly be applied to a law
imposing civil or criminal sanctions on presidential candidates who
fail to disclose their tax returns. Under Anderson-Burdick, an election
law deserves strict scrutiny only if it severely burdens the rights of
candidates or voters.244 Here, the disclosure of tax returns infringes no
more on a candidate’s First Amendment right to speech than does the
disclosure of campaign-related finances under the FECA. Neither
requirement imposes a “ceiling on campaign-related activities”245 or
“prevent[s] anyone from speaking.”246 To the extent that they affect
First Amendment speech rights, they do so indirectly.247 Because
disclosure generally does not limit association, belief, or important
and intimate decision-making in an absolute sense, the burdens it

240. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1133 (5th Cir. 1978).
241. Id. at 1134.
242. See id. at 1131–32.
243. See id. at 1134 (describing a balancing test).
244. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into
the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation
burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. . . . [W]hen those rights are subjected to ‘severe’
restrictions, ‘the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
importance.’ . . . But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” (first
quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992); and then quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 788 (1983))).
245. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
246. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003), overruled in part on other
grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
247. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
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imposes do not rise to a level “severe” enough to warrant strict
scrutiny.
However, even if disclosure laws do not absolutely bar First
Amendment activities, they nevertheless place some burden on the
First Amendment right to “privacy of association and belief.”248 In
Buckley, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to the FECA’s
reporting requirements after acknowledging that the disclosure of
campaign contributions may in some instances deter associational
activity—i.e., donations—that might otherwise have occurred if it
could have been conducted in private.249 Here, disclosure places an
analogous burden on candidates. Tax returns may reveal association
through employment, belief through charitable donations, and other
information that might burden a candidate’s First Amendment rights.
For example, an individual who entertains the idea of running for
office may think twice about donating to unpopular political or
religious organizations. And even if a candidate’s tax returns reveal
nothing political or religious in nature, the Court has made clear that
“it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural
matters, . . . state action which may have the effect of curtailing the
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”250
Furthermore, the disclosure of tax returns may deter some from
running for office. Although the Court has not “attached such
fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of
review,” it has recognized that “the rights of voters and the rights of
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation.”251 The Court
has therefore struck down laws that overly burden candidacy,
including early filing deadlines,252 minimum signature
requirements,253 and exorbitant filing fees.254 Admittedly, the
disclosure of tax returns does not interfere as directly with candidacy
as a filing fee. But the burden it places on candidacy is of the same
248. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
249. Id. at 68 (“[P]ublic disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter
some individuals who otherwise might contribute.”).
250. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460–61 (1958).
251. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142–43 (1972).
252. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 805–06 (1983).
253. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183–87 (1979);
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–94 (1992); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24–25 (1968).
254. See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 134–35.
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kind and quality as the burden FECA campaign contribution reports
place on donors. Both burden core political activity. The FECA does
so by deterring individuals from contributing to campaigns, and the
proposed law does so by deterring individuals from running for office.
Consequently, under the Court’s reasoning in Buckley, courts should
apply intermediate scrutiny to a law compelling the disclosure of tax
returns by presidential candidates.
Not all courts have utilized this line of reasoning to apply
heightened scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit based its decision in Plante on
a more expansive view of a constitutionally protected right to
privacy.255 Although the court might have saved itself a lot of trouble
by recognizing, in the vein of Buckley, that “financial disclosure laws
[impinge upon the] freedom of association, of belief, and of
speech,”256 it nevertheless arrived at the same result. Despite
eventually settling on a balancing test, the court utilized language
echoing intermediate scrutiny. Of Florida’s interests, the court wrote
that “[t]he importance of these goals cannot be denied.”257 And of the
relation between the Florida amendment and these interests, the court
stated that disclosure “should help,” and that “more effective methods
are not obvious.”258
Although the Supreme Court has yet to adopt as broad a view of
the right to privacy as the Fifth Circuit, it need not do so to find that
the disclosure of tax returns burdens the “privacy of association and
belief”259—a right it has recognized—to an extent warranting some
scrutiny. As was the case with the FECA’s reporting requirement and
Florida’s Sunshine Amendment, a law penalizing the failure of
candidates to produce relevant financial information neither burdens a
fundamental right so severely as to warrant strict scrutiny, nor imposes
so little a burden on candidates—and by extension, the voters that
support them—as to deserve only the simple courtesy of rational basis
review. Indeed, the weight of the reasoning in Buckley, Plante, and
other decisions by state and lower federal courts indicate that the
appropriate standard with which to evaluate the compelled disclosure
law is one of intermediate scrutiny.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See supra Part III.B.2.a.
Slevin v. City of New York, 477 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1135.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
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b. Applying intermediate scrutiny
To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, a law compelling the release of
candidate tax returns must be substantially related to serving an
important government interest.260 Both Buckley and Plante identified
three important government interests: voter education, the deterrence
of corruption or its appearance, and the detection of violations of the
law.261 The proposed law need only substantially relate to one of these
interests.
The most obvious reason for requiring the release of candidate tax
returns is voter education. The Buckley Court stated that disclosure of
“[t]he sources of a candidate’s financial support . . . alert the voter to
the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and
thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.”262 Income
tax returns are similar to campaign contributions in this way. Because
both reveal the sources of a candidate’s financial support, both identify
sources of candidate interest and potential conflicts of interest. A
President whose campaign is supported mostly by farmers may be
inclined to support policies benefiting farmers; a President who
derives most of his or her income from agricultural businesses would
likely have the same inclinations.263 In fact, because candidates are
likely to be more sensitive to issues impacting their own sources of
income than they are to those affecting their donors, the disclosure of
income tax returns arguably does a better job educating voters about
the issues “to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive.”264
An equally if not more important government interest is the
deterrence of corruption or its appearance. The Buckley Court upheld
the FECA in part because its “disclosure requirements deter actual
corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large

260. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (describing an “intermediate” level of
scrutiny when analyzing the constitutionality of gender classifications).
261. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68; Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134.
262. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
263. Although candidates typically relinquish control of their businesses and equitable holdings
upon assuming office, mere possession of income-generating assets can influence a candidate’s
decisions. For example, although President Trump claims to have resigned from his positions in
400 business entities, his ownership stake in many of these entities may still influence his policy
decisions as President. Resignation Letter from Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S. (Jan. 19,
2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3404759/DJT-Resignation-Signature-PageWith-Exhibit-a.pdf.
264. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
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contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.”265 Of
particular concern was the possibility that donors might support a
candidate as a quid pro quo for special favors after the candidate
assumes office.266 Public records not only expose these types of
arrangements, they discourage them as well.267 But even in the
absence of such arrangements, disclosure maintains the public’s
confidence in the political process and the elected officials it
produces.268
Here, income tax returns serve a similar purpose. Suspect
agreements between candidates and those that seek to influence them
may involve more than just campaign donations. They may include
employment, gifts, loans, or other benefits. The Fifth Circuit in Plante
considered the argument that “few [candidates] are likely to make a
public disclosure of illegal income,” but concluded that it was enough
for “the existence of the reporting requirement [to] discourage
corruption.”269 Candidates are less apt to accept questionable gifts if
they need to take additional steps to hide them. And now that the
FECA has closed the door to large anonymous campaign
contributions,270 the government has a greater interest in deterring
those who may wish to circumvent the FECA’s reporting requirements
by giving to candidates directly instead of contributing to their
campaigns.
Moreover, quid pro quo arrangements often allow candidates to
profit indirectly through their family members. Because income tax
returns include information not just of the candidates themselves, but
also of their spouses and dependents, the disclosure of such returns has
the potential to expose flavors of corruption not easily discovered by
an examination of campaign ledgers. For example, in 2004, Darleen
Druyun pled guilty to improperly favoring Boeing in procurement
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. (“[E]xposure may discourage those who would use money for improper purposes either
before or after the election.”); see also Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978)
(“[T]he existence of the reporting requirement will discourage corruption.”).
268. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness
of the opportunities for abuse . . . .”); see also Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134–35 (discussing the
government’s interest in the “creation of public confidence in Florida’s officials”).
269. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1135.
270. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2) (2018) (requiring the disclosure of the names, addresses, and
occupations of donors who contribute more than $200 to a campaign).

(12) 54.1_TANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

352

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/13/21 2:18 PM

[Vol. 54:317

decisions while serving as the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition.271 Boeing had not only offered Druyun a
lucrative job to commence shortly after she retired from the Air
Force,272 it had also hired her daughter and her daughter’s fiancé.273
Druyun later admitted that “Boeing’s employment of her future sonin-law and her daughter . . . along with her own desire to be employed
at Boeing, influenced her government decisions in matters affecting
Boeing.”274 Although Druyun was not an elected official, even if she
were, the campaign finance disclosures she would have to make under
the FECA would not have uncovered this type of under-the-table
dealmaking. On the other hand, the disclosure of her income tax
returns would have had a greater chance of revealing her conflict of
interest with Boeing.
While one might argue that the Internal Revenue Service’s
possession of income tax returns obviates the need for public
disclosure, the Buckley Court found the additional benefits of public
scrutiny to warrant its costs.275 As better put by Justice Brandeis:
“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman.”276 Even if the government could be
expected to uncover all the illegal activity revealed by candidate tax
returns, the public’s interest extends beyond the enforcement of laws.
Not all unethical conduct is illegal, and not all evidence of illegal
activity is sufficient for conviction. The public can do much with
information suggestive of corruption but falling short of that which the
government could act on. Finally, even supposing public disclosure
uncovers no evidence of wrongdoing, it engenders “public confidence
in [government] officials.”277 It is not enough simply to deter
corruption. “[A]voidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is

271. See L-3 Commc’ns Integrated Sys., L.P. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 453, 457–58 (2007).
272. Druyun’s salary was to be $250,000 a year and include a $50,000 bonus. Id. at 457.
273. Id. at 454.
274. Id. at 458 (citation omitted).
275. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (“[D]isclosure requirements—certainly in
most applications—appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign
ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist.”).
276. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat’l
Home Libr. Found. ed., 1933) (1914).
277. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).
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also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”278
The final government interest in disclosure relates specifically to
exposing illegal activity. Of the three, this interest bears the least
relation to the proposed law. Perhaps that is why both Buckley and
Plante put it last in their enumeration of legitimate government
goals.279 While public scrutiny undoubtedly aids in the detection of
unlawful conduct, the disclosure of tax returns to the government
accomplishes substantially the same purposes. If this incremental aid
to law enforcement justified disclosure to the public, little would
prevent a state from requiring presidential candidates to publicly
disclose all the documents they are required to submit to the
government. Although the Buckley Court approved this interest, it did
so with little discussion as to the necessity of public disclosure.280 The
Plante court was more explicit in finding this interest wanting.281
However, this Note need not resolve the issue, because the proposed
law substantially relates to accomplishing the two other important
government interests discussed above, i.e., voter education and the
deterrence of corruption or its appearance.
Ultimately, a law requiring presidential candidates to disclose
their tax returns will likely survive any First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges because it satisfies the intermediate level of
scrutiny required under the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick test.
c. Distinguishing from other unconstitutional disclosure laws
It remains to distinguish the proposed law from others the courts
have struck down. The Buckley Court made it clear that a disclosure
law need not exempt information that might lead to harassment to be
constitutional on its face.282 However, the Court in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission found that disclosure may become overly
intrusive when it associates individuals with personal and potentially

278. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
279. See id. at 66–68; Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134.
280. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
281. See Plante, 575 F.2d at 1135 (“The [last] interest . . . , aiding detection and prosecution of
violations, seems less affected by the [Florida] Amendment than the others. While misdeeds may
be deterred by the need to file either honest or perjurious financial statements, once they have been
committed, the statements may well be useless.”).
282. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
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provocative statements that are inherently likely to “precipitate
retaliation.”283 Here, the nature of the financial information contained
in income tax returns is closer to that of the campaign contributions in
Buckley than the leaflets opposing a tax proposal in McIntyre.
Although both may “give[] away something about [a candidate’s]
political views,” income tax returns remain a far cry from “a
personally crafted statement of a political viewpoint.”284 The contents
of income tax returns are much less likely to “precipitate retaliation”285
than political leaflets. Indeed, the Plante court found the possibility of
kidnapping, solicitations, and embarrassment resulting from financial
disclosure insufficient to warrant facial invalidation,286 likely because
the potential for such occurrences is too remote or too inconsequential.
Nevertheless, because courts have expressed a greater willingness
to accept disclosure laws that provide some sort of safeguard against
harassment,287 California can head off potential challenges by
providing a procedural mechanism for candidates to redact
particularly sensitive information. SB 27 included a provision
requiring submitted tax returns to omit social security numbers, home
addresses, telephone numbers, and medical information.288 It also
permitted the redaction of the names of dependent minors, employer
identification numbers, business addresses, and similar information
regarding paid tax return preparers.289 Any law requiring the
production of tax returns would do well to adopt similar provisions.290
283. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See Plante, 575 F.2d at 1135.
287. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
288. See S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
289. Id.
290. While public disclosure of the financial information contained in income tax returns
generally serves the government interests articulated in Part III.B.3.b, the same cannot be said of
the non-financial personal information contained on the same returns. Perhaps the only government
interest served by not allowing candidates to redact their addresses, telephone numbers, and other
identifying information is the avoidance of the minor inconvenience of having to verify or
otherwise accommodate such redactions. It is unlikely that courts would find this administrative
interest important enough to support a disclosure statute that does not allow candidates to omit
purely personal information. On the other hand, some financial information may be considered
sensitive, and may serve only some of the government interests delineated in Part III.B.3.b. For
example, a candidate may consider her charitable donations to be personal in nature, and their
disclosure is unlikely to expose or deter corruption or violations of law. Nevertheless, because the
disclosure of charitable donations promotes the important government interest of voter education,
a tax return disclosure law likely does not have to provide for the redaction of such donations to
survive constitutional scrutiny.
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Alternatively, a financial disclosure law could adopt Florida’s
approach and allow candidates to submit “[a] sworn statement which
identifies each separate source and amount of income which exceeds
$1,000” in lieu of their tax returns.291
The other major reservation courts have expressed about financial
disclosure laws concerns their scope. However, unlike Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., this is not a case
requiring disclosure from election workers when the real concern is
with the motives of those hiring them.292 The proposed law requires
disclosure from the candidates themselves, the individuals whose
motives and interests it is primarily concerned with. Nor is this a case
requiring disclosure from low-ranking government officials or their
spouses and children.293 The proposed law requires disclosure only
from candidates for the highest-ranking office in the country.
Moreover, unlike the anonymous leafleteer in McIntyre or the spouses
and children of government officials, presidential candidates, more
than anyone else, have voluntarily thrust themselves into the political
arena.294 In fact, although the Supreme Court in McIntyre struck down
an Ohio statute requiring source attribution on campaign literature
because it “applie[d] not only to the activities of candidates and their
organized supporters, but also to individuals acting independently and
using only their own modest resources,”295 it has since upheld the
“Stand by Your Ad” provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act requiring candidates to appear in television advertisements they
have authorized or paid for and state that they have approved the
291. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8.
292. See Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (striking down a law
requiring the disclosure of the names, addresses, and salaries of paid petition circulators when the
primary interest of the state was in identifying those who hired the petition circulators, not the
petition circulators themselves); see also supra Part III.B.1.b.
293. See, e.g., City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 232–33 (Cal. 1970)
(invalidating a California disclosure statute in part because it applied to even the lowest of
government officials, as well as their immediate family members). But see County of Nevada v.
MacMillen, 522 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Cal. 1974) (upholding a statute requiring the disclosure of
property owned by a government official’s spouse or dependent children because “although an
official may have no economic interest in such property, nevertheless he may react favorably, or
without total objectivity, to a proposal which could materially enhance the value of that property”).
294. The Fifth Circuit noted that candidates for office have less of a reasonable expectation of
privacy because they choose to subject themselves to public scrutiny. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575
F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978). It also observed that the Court’s decision in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) provides candidates with less protection against libel and slander
for this very reason. Id.
295. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 351 (1995).
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message contained in the advertisement.296 The Court has thus
indicated a greater willingness to uphold disclosure statutes that apply
only to candidates or their campaigns.
In sum, because the compelled disclosure law proposed by this
Note is substantially related to important government interests that the
Court itself has recognized, and because it avoids many of the issues
that have proven fatal to other financial disclosure laws, it is likely to
withstand First and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.
IV. INFORMING VOTERS ABOUT TAX RETURN DISCLOSURE THROUGH
BALLOT DESIGNATIONS
Rather than compelling the production of tax returns with threats
of civil or criminal sanctions, California might instead choose to
inform voters of the fact that a candidate has failed to disclose his or
her tax returns. Alternatively, California could provide candidates who
have disclosed their tax returns the opportunity to directly
communicate their disclosure to voters. These statements, made either
by California or the candidates themselves, could be printed as a ballot
designation or in the informational materials California sends to
registered voters prior to elections.297 Because this method of
incentivizing disclosure is less heavy-handed than the compelled
disclosure laws described in Part III, it is the more likely of the two to
pass constitutional muster. After all, statements indicating whether
candidates have released their tax returns likely impose less of a First
and Fourteenth Amendment burden on candidates than does a
requirement that such tax returns be released. Under this approach, a
candidate may decline to release his or her tax returns and still appear
on the ballot298 without fear of civil or criminal liability.299

296. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 230–31 (2003), overruled in part on
other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 52 U.S.C.
§ 30120(d)(1)(B) (2018).
297. California mails voter information guides to registered voters prior to every presidential
election. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9094 (Deering 2020).
298. SB 27 would have prevented such a candidate from appearing on the ballot altogether.
S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“Notwithstanding any other law, the Secretary of State
shall not print the name of a candidate for President of the United States on a primary election
ballot, unless the candidate, at least 98 days before the presidential primary election, files with the
Secretary of State copies of every income tax return the candidate filed with the Internal Revenue
Service in the five most recent taxable years . . . .”).
299. A compelled disclosure law would subject such a candidate to civil or criminal sanctions.
See supra Part III.
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Correspondingly, voters may cast ballots for a candidate irrespective
of the candidate’s decision to disclose his or her tax returns.
However, ballot designation laws resurrect the potential for
invalidation under the Article II Qualifications Clause. Article II
prohibits the addition of substantive qualifications to the presidency,
and one of the primary objections to SB 27 was that it indirectly added
a qualification by limiting ballot access to those who have disclosed
their tax returns.300 Compelled disclosure laws avoid this issue by
sanctioning candidates independently of the electoral process—a
candidate’s refusal to release his or her tax returns does not
disadvantage or otherwise affect his or her candidacy.301 But ballot
designations, like ballot access restrictions, are intimately tied to
elections. They influence voters “at the most crucial stage in the
electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast.”302 Moreover, by
drawing a voter’s attention to a single piece of information, they
necessarily imply that the information is important to the voter’s
choice.303 Like SB 27, a ballot designation does not literally disqualify
candidates who have failed to disclose their tax returns.304 But just as
courts may consider SB 27 an impermissible attempt to disqualify
candidates who have not disclosed their tax returns,305 courts may take
a similar view of a ballot designation that disfavors the same class of
candidates by highlighting their nondisclosure. So while a ballot
designation law may effectively address the First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges faced by SB 27, it remains susceptible to the
same Qualifications Clause challenge.
The remainder of this Note will examine both the Qualifications
Clause and the First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to a
hypothetical ballot designation law that informs voters about the
availability of candidate tax returns on the ballot itself. Although this
Note will not discuss the constitutionality of a law providing the same
information in a voter information guide, it suffices to say that a law
that prints information in a voter information guide is even more likely

300. See supra Part II.B.
301. See supra Part III.A.
302. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).
303. See id.
304. Candidates who do not appear on the ballot can still run as write-in candidates in
California. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8600 (Deering 2020).
305. See supra Part II.
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to withstand constitutional scrutiny than one that appropriates space
on the ballot.306
A. Qualifications Clause Challenge
It is important to note at the outset that if SB 27 satisfied the
strictures of Article II, it follows a fortiori that the proposed ballot
designation law must as well. In both cases, the claimed substantive
qualification is the same: Presidents must have released their tax
returns to hold office. But a ballot designation that merely informs
voters of a candidate’s failure to release his or her tax returns does no
more to disqualify the candidate than SB 27’s denial of ballot access.
This line of reasoning does not extend to the converse. A ballot
designation law may survive a Qualifications Clause challenge even if
SB 27 would not have. In fact, courts have indicated a willingness to
uphold ballot designations that would likely violate Article II if the
designations formed the basis for ballot access restrictions. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has upheld California’s election code
allowing candidates not only to designate their occupation, but also to
designate themselves as the “incumbent” if the word accurately
describes them.307 And the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld party
membership and party preference designations.308 Nevertheless, the
Court’s precedents make clear that the Presidential and Congressional
Qualifications Clauses would not tolerate the removal of candidates
from the ballot on the basis of occupation, incumbency, or party
affiliation.309
The disparity in the Court’s treatment of ballot access restrictions
and ballot designations should not be surprising, as removal from the
ballot will invariably disadvantage a candidate more than a ballot
designation would. But the difference between the ballot designations
306. Although both the ballot and the voter information guide bear the imprimatur of the state,
a voter information guide will likely have less of a disqualifying effect because it does not influence
voters “the instant before the vote is cast.” Anderson, 375 U.S. at 402.
307. See Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2002).
308. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding a
Minnesota law allowing candidates to appear on the ballot as a nominee from a single political
party); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (upholding a
Washington law allowing candidates to designate their party preference).
309. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995) (stating that the
Qualifications Clauses do not allow states to “dress eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access
clothing” (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 357 (Ark. 1994), aff’d sub nom,
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995))).
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the Court has upheld and those the Court has struck down cannot be
explained solely by a lesser disqualifying impact. Despite being
widely accepted, the aforementioned ballot designations have large
and obvious discriminatory effects—the incumbency advantage has
been widely documented,310 and many citizens vote strictly on party
lines.311 Rather, the hallmark of unconstitutional ballot designations is
not merely their discriminatory effect, but their discriminatory
purpose. The following cases highlight the Court’s focus on
discriminatory purpose as a central reason for invalidating ballotrelated legislation.
1. Discriminatory Purpose and Discriminatory Effect
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Supreme Court struck
down an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution that excluded
candidates who had already served three terms in the House of
Representatives or two terms in the Senate from appearing on the
general election ballot.312 The Court held that the Constitution neither
sets term limits for members of Congress nor grants the States the
authority to set such limits.313 Furthermore, the Court rejected
Arkansas’s argument that the amendment did not actually set term
limits because candidates who exceeded the specified number of terms
could still run and win as write-in candidates, because “even if . . .
incumbents may occasionally win reelection as write-in candidates,
there is no denying that the ballot restrictions will make it significantly
more difficult for the barred candidate to win the election.”314 The fact
that the Arkansas amendment offered candidates who did not meet its
qualifications an alternative path to victory did not save it. In the
Court’s view, “an amendment with the avowed purpose and obvious

310. Analysis of election data shows in the 2018 congressional races, incumbency alone
accounted for, on average, close to a 3 percent advantage in the popular vote. As recently as 1998,
incumbency accounted for an 8 percent advantage. Nathaniel Rakich, How Much Was Incumbency
Worth in 2018?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 6, 2018, 5:58 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
how-much-was-incumbency-worth-in-2018/.
311. In fact, nine states allow straight-ticket voting, whereby a voter can “choose a party’s
entire slate of candidates with just a single ballot mark.” Straight Ticket Voting States,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 25, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/electionsand-campaigns/straight-ticket-voting.aspx.
312. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 783.
313. Id. at 806.
314. Id. at 830–31.
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effect of evading the requirements of the Qualifications Clauses by
handicapping a class of candidates cannot stand.”315
A few years later, Missouri attempted to accomplish substantially
the same goals with a ballot designation law.316 An amendment to the
Missouri Constitution required the state to print “DISREGARDED
VOTERS’ INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS” by the names of
incumbent candidates who did not support a “Congressional Term
Limits Amendment” to the Federal Constitution, and “DECLINED
TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS” by the names of
nonincumbent candidates who did not pledge support to the same
federal amendment.317 Although the Missouri amendment erected a
much lower barrier to the candidacy of those who did not support term
limits, the Court in Cook v. Gralike318 nevertheless found it violative
of the Congressional Qualifications Clause.319 The Missouri
amendment had the purpose of discriminating against a class of
candidates, having been “plainly designed to favor candidates who are
willing to support the particular form of a term limits amendment set
forth in its text and to disfavor those who either oppose term limits
entirely or would prefer a different proposal.”320 Furthermore, it had
the intended effect, for “[w]hile the precise damage the labels may
exact on candidates is disputed between the parties, the labels surely
place their targets at a political disadvantage to unmarked candidates
for congressional office.”321
The Court’s reasoning in U.S. Term Limits and Cook closely
parallels its Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence.
When considering the constitutionality of laws under the Equal

315. Id. at 831 (emphasis added).
316. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 514 (2001).
317. See id. at 514–15.
318. 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
319. The district court held the Missouri amendment violated the Congressional Qualifications
Clause because it had “the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications for Congress indirectly
and [had] the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates for Congress.” Gralike v. Cook,
996 F. Supp. 917, 920 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (emphasis added), aff’d, 191 F.3d 191 (8th Cir. 1999),
aff’d, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding the amendment “seeks to impose
an additional qualification for candidacy for Congress and does so in a manner which is highly
likely to handicap term limit opponents and other labeled candidates.” Cook, 191 F.3d at 924. The
Supreme Court ultimately agreed. Cook, 531 U.S. at 527.
320. Cook, 531 U.S. at 524.
321. Id. at 525.
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Protection Clause,322 the Court has similarly emphasized their purpose
and effect. In Anderson v. Martin,323 the Court invalidated the
compulsory identification of a candidate’s race on the ballot under the
Equal Protection Clause.324 Considered “in the light of ‘private
attitudes and pressures’ towards Negroes at the time of its enactment,”
the ballot designations not only had a discriminatory purpose of a
“purely racial character,” they “could only result in [a] ‘repressive
effect.’”325 Even outside the election context, the Court has suggested
that heightened scrutiny should apply to laws that indirectly
discriminate—i.e., have a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory
effect326—based on suspect classifications. 327 The Court has thus far
found classifications based on, inter alia, race,328 alienage,329 and
gender,330 to be suspect.
However, in applying the Qualifications Clauses to prohibit ballot
designations with both a discriminatory purpose and discriminatory
effect, the Court makes no distinction among classes of candidates.
Instead, the Court has simply held that the Constitution never granted
states the authority “to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor
a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional
restraints.”331 Presumably, the only class of presidential candidates a
state can purpose to discriminate against are those who are not natural
born citizens, those who are under thirty-five years of age, or those
who have not resided fourteen years within the United States.332
322. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
323. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
324. See id. at 404.
325. Id. at 403 (first quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); and then
quoting Goss v. Bd. of Educ. of Knoxville, 373 U. S. 683, 688 (1963)).
326. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(“Proof of . . . discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact is
not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of . . . discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution.”).
327. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
328. See id.
329. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).
330. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 531 (1996).
331. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34 (1995).
332. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. This is not to say states cannot enact reasonable ballot
access laws. The purpose of such laws is generally to prevent “voter confusion, ballot
overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies,” not to discriminate against those
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2. Ballot Designations as a Form of Voter Education
Assuming, arguendo, that SB 27 violated Article II as an indirect
attempt to establish a substantive qualification, a ballot designation
indicating whether a candidate has released his or her tax returns may
nevertheless be constitutional as a procedural mechanism with a
nondiscriminatory purpose. That purpose would be voter education. In
fact, California’s ballot designation regulations explicitly state that
their primary purpose “is to ensure the accurate designation of the
candidate upon the ballot in order that an informed electorate may
intelligently elect one of the candidates.”333
Whether the Supreme Court would accept this stated purpose
likely depends in large part on the language of the designation itself.
In Cook v. Gralike, the Court relied on the lower courts’ description
of the ballot designations as “‘pejorative,’ ‘negative,’ ‘derogatory,’
‘intentionally intimidating,’ ‘particularly harmful,’ ‘politically
damaging,’ ‘a serious sanction,’ ‘a penalty,’ and ‘official
denunciation.’”334 Certainly, if the proposed ballot designation only
applied to candidates who had failed to disclose their tax returns and
consisted of the words “DECLINED TO RELEASE TAX
RETURNS” similar to the “DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT
TERM LIMITS” label in Cook,335 one might infer a discriminatory
purpose. However, more impartial methods exist to convey the same
information. For example, California could simply print either “Tax
Returns Available” or “Tax Returns Unavailable” under the name of
every candidate. This has the advantage of placing a neutral label
under every candidate’s name, instead of singling out only some for
designation.
However, a “Tax Returns Available” or “Tax Returns
Unavailable” designation provides voters with little useful
information about a candidate, indicating only a willingness on the
part of the candidate to be transparent with his or her finances. This
undermines the State’s claim that voter education motivates the
candidates who are unable to obtain a minimum number of signatures, for example. See Munro v.
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986).
333. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 20710(a) (2020).
334. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 524 (2001) (first quoting Cook v. Gralike, 191 F.3d 911,
918, 919, 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 531 U.S. 510 (2001); and then quoting Cook v. Gralike,
996 F. Supp. 901, 908, 910, 916 (W.D. Mo. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 531
U.S. 510 (2001)).
335. See id.
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designation. Although unorthodox, California could strengthen its
case by instead printing “Tax Returns Available at:” followed by a link
to the tax returns or a summary of the tax returns on a state-hosted
website whenever they are available.336 For candidates who have not
disclosed their tax returns, California could refrain from printing
anything at all. This both reduces the appearance of a discriminatory
purpose and reduces the discriminatory effect of such a ballot
designation scheme. The absence of a label is far less likely to
disadvantage a candidate than a label calling attention to the
candidate’s failure to act in accordance with the State’s wishes. And
when present, the label provides voters with more information, thus
better serving the government’s stated goal of voter education.
B. First and Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
Even if the proposed ballot designation law overcomes the
Qualifications Clause challenges discussed above, it must still contend
with First and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. However, because
ballot designations burden candidates’ rights to a far lesser extent than
the denial of ballot access, the proposed law will likely survive claims
that it violates either the First or Fourteenth Amendment.
Most First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to ballot
designation laws center around claims that they unconstitutionally
burden a candidate or political party’s right to speech or association.
For example, in Rubin v. City of Santa Monica,337 a candidate argued
that a set of election regulations allowing him to specify his occupation
on the ballot, but preventing him from designating himself as a “peace
activist,” violated his First Amendment right to speech.338 The Ninth
Circuit upheld this restriction on speech for being viewpoint neutral.339
And in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party,340 multiple political parties contended that a statute allowing
candidates to designate their party preference on the ballot violated its

336. The designation “Tax Returns Available at:” would be much more inconspicuous in a voter
information guide. For presidential elections, the voter information guides contain “a notice that
refers voters to the Secretary of State’s internet website for information about candidates for the
offices of President and Vice President of the United States.” See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9084(k)
(Deering 2020).
337. 308 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2002).
338. Id. at 1012–13.
339. Id. at 1015.
340. 552 U.S. 442 (2008).

(12) 54.1_TANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

364

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/13/21 2:18 PM

[Vol. 54:317

First Amendment associational rights by forcing them to associate
with candidates they might not have endorsed.341 The Supreme Court
upheld the statute because it could be implemented in such a way so
as to make clear that a party preference designation did not amount to
a party endorsement.342
The proposed law does not implicate any of the concerns thus
described. A ballot designation consisting of the words “Tax Returns
Available,” “Tax Returns Unavailable,” or “Tax Returns Available
at:” does not constitute candidate speech. Because the words are
chosen by the state, they are better characterized as state speech.
Although this raises separate constitutional issues—for example, they
may constitute an indirect attempt by the state to establish candidate
qualifications in violation of Article II343—they do not raise any First
Amendment right to speech issues. The Court has never required states
to allow candidates a forum for speech on the ballot.344 Rather, the
Court has only required that when a state does provide such a forum,
it does not restrict speech in unreasonable ways.345 Nor does the state’s
speech imply associations that do not exist. The availability and
location of candidate tax returns are neutral statements that do not
imply candidate association with a political party or any other
organization.
Finally, although a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
claim could be raised, it is unlikely to be successful. An Equal
Protection challenge would compel a standard of review no higher
than rational basis review for the simple reason that candidates who
refuse to disclose their tax returns do not constitute a suspect class.346
But even if the Court were to apply the Equal Protection Clause to this
context, its analysis would not differ significantly from the
Qualifications Clause analysis detailed in Part IV.A.
341. Id. at 448.
342. Id. at 456.
343. See supra Part IV.A.
344. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997) (“Ballots serve
primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression.”).
345. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (holding that once the government
creates a forum for speech, it “assume[s] an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions
under applicable constitutional norms”).
346. See Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (dispensing with
an Equal Protection challenge to a statute allowing candidates to designate their incumbency status
or occupation on the ballot, because “[n]either ‘non-incumbents’ nor ‘peace activists’ is a suspect
class”).
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In sum, because the proposed ballot designation law is rationally
related to the accomplishment of a legitimate government interest—
that of voter education—it will likely survive First and Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
A California law hoping to incentivize the release of candidate
tax returns must comply with article II, section 5(c) of the California
Constitution, which prohibits the exclusion from the primary ballot
those recognized nationally or state-wide as running “for the office of
President of the United States.”347 Additionally, to comply with the
Federal Constitution, such a law must prove first, that it does not add
substantive qualifications to the presidency in contravention of the
Article II Qualifications Clause,348 and second, that it does not violate
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of candidates or voters.349
Although California’s first attempt at drafting such a law was
struck down for precluding even nationally recognized candidates
from appearing on the presidential primary ballot if they failed to
produce their tax returns,350 California has non-ballot-access means at
its disposal to motivate disclosure. First, California can civilly or
criminally sanction the nondisclosure of tax returns instead of
conditioning ballot access on their production. This approach would
largely avoid Qualifications Clause issues,351 while the penalties it
imposes are unlikely to overly burden any First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.352 Alternatively, California can allow ballot
designations that direct voters to the tax returns of the candidates who
have released them. Although this approach will likely be less
effective at compelling the disclosure, it implicates fewer First and
Fourteenth Amendment concerns and stands on much more solid
constitutional footing.353

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
See Patterson v. Padilla, 451 P.3d 1171, 1191 (Cal. 2019).
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
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